Dealing with the dragon at our doorsteps, firmly and wisely
By
Amar Nath Wadehra and Randeep Wadehra
Recently China has acquired an aircraft career of mixed Ukrainian-Russian pedigree. Presently, it is undergoing sea trials and would become fully operational in the next few months – expert estimates vary from three to six months. It goes without saying that this event directly impacts India’s strategic configurations. Capable of carrying three dozen aircraft plus an array of missiles of variegated ranges and roles, it is bigger than the two aircraft careers with the Indian Navy. This does not call for sounding the war bugle but certainly should impel us to take notice of the increasing Chinese reach – not just in the Asia-Pacific region but also across the Indian Ocean. Let us not forget that China has been developing a port facility in Myanmar at Sittwe as well as helping develop ports in Sri Lanka’s Hambantota and Pakistan’s Gwadar. There are indications of Chinese interests in Bangladesh’s Chittagong deep-sea port too. While we may reassure ourselves that these developments are only to protect China’s mercantile interests (more than 60% of its energy supplies come by the sea lanes) it would be unwise to ignore the strategic-military consequences. Nothing that China does is without long term military calculations; we learnt this to our great cost by the series of events that led to the 1962 Chinese invasion of India.
Although “wasted years” would be slightly exaggerated it is true that the first five decades after India’s independence remained Pakistan-centric despite the 1962 drubbing at China’s hands. India’s strategic community focused only on Pakistan as far as the country’s security was concerned. Then there were lotus eaters among our intellectuals who advocated that there really was no need for having regular military! They and others of their ilk in our decision/opinion making elite ensured a rather tardy progress in India’s defense preparedness. Worse, there was no long term official perspective vis-à-vis the emerging strategic scenario in the Indian Ocean, let alone the world at large. Our policy makers were happy to remain camp followers of the Soviet Union, presuming permanency of various strategic equations.
Therefore, when the Soviet Union disintegrated and Communist China emerged as the alternate challenge to the only super power in the world – our policy makers were caught unawares. It took a series of fortuitous events like the 9/11 and emergence of Al Qaida as credible threat to the Western countries in general and the United States in particular to enable India to reconfigure a more advantageous status in the comity of nations.
Today India is beset with several challenges in its neighbourhood where China’s influence and military presence has become tactile enough – and not just in Pakistan or Myanmar. Even Nepal is increasingly tilting towards China for military hardware and training. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Mauritius are being assiduously wooed by the Chinese through economic and military aid. So, what are options before India? On the one hand we must keep our backyard clear of hostile presence. At the moment Pakistan is the only country that has been actively waging low cost warfare against India. The other countries do have issues, but these can be resolved in a spirit of good neighborliness – as is being done with Bangladesh. With Sri Lanka the Tamil problem is a major issue on several counts – chiefly humanitarian. Although India has been pushing the island nation to compensate and rehabilitate the devastated Tamil population (which has also suffered systematic genocide at the hands of the Sri Lankan army) there is much that needs to be done.
India also needs to build economic as well as military ties with countries that are geographically very close to China. In this respect the recent visit of President Pratibha Patil to Mongolia was a positive step. Mongolia has several issues with China relating to territory, natural resources and security. Pacts on defense and harnessing of natural resources with Mongolia enable India to have a countervailing presence on China’s periphery. Similarly, Japan has been more than willing to join hands with India on various economic and strategic matters despite its reservations regarding India’s nuclear policy. Vietnam, Cambodia, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea have been only too willing to have India as
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